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LESLEY A. RIMMEL
SVODKI AND POPULAR OPINION 
IN STALINIST LENINGRAD*
THE RELATION OF PROPAGANDA TO POPULAR OPINION in the Soviet Union has been of
interest to scholars for at least half a century, and it will undoubtedly continue to be
as long as the question of peoples relation to the regime remains an issue. In what
proportions did Soviet citizens support the regime, resist it, fear it, or were apathetic
to it? How can researchers approach these complicated questions? What are the
most useful sources for learning about the Soviet populations perceptions of the
regime? 
We have not, of course, been without sources on popular opinion for the past
fifty years. Archives and émigré interviews in the West, such as in the captured
Smolensk archive, the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, the
Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History at Columbia
University, and the Hoover Institution Archive at Stanford University, as well as
published and unpublished memoirs, have provided information on peoples
outlook, as well as giving us an idea of just what issues absorbed them. All of these
sources are useful. But the materials in these collections are insufficient in quantity,
recorded events long after the fact, or come from regions that did not include a
heterogeneous mix of the population. Newly published or discovered diaries
represent an additional source of information on peoples beliefs during the Stalin
years.1 The latter are especially helpful in delineating an individuals personal
development over a period of time. Another more recently available  but quickly
1. See, for example, Jochen Hellbeck, Fashioning the Stalinist soul: The diary of Stepan
Podlubnyi (1931-1939), Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 44 (1996): 344-373;
Veronique Garros, Natasha Korenevskaia, Thomas Lahusen, eds, Intimacy and terror: Soviet
diaries of the 1930s, trans. Carol Flath (New York: New Press, 1995).
* I would like to thank Andrea Graziosi and Anatol Shmelev for their comments on earlier
drafts of this essay. I am also grateful to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at
Stanford University for a Title VIII grant that enabled me to write up this article.
218 LESLEY A. RIMMEL
disappearing  source is that of oral histories and interviews with survivors of the
Stalin era.2
But these sources  all of which are necessary in order to attempt to create a
balanced picture  do not provide the quantity, or variety, needed to make any
kind of demographic generalizations, especially about the less educated and less
powerful people.3 What we do have now (at least in some localities), which we did
not have access to before the opening of the archives to foreign and non-
Communist scholars, are official svodki, or reports, on popular dispositions.
Perhaps the term svodka is confusing, for these reports varied greatly in their
provenance, methods, goals, and reliability. Reports from the secret police, for
example, focused on negative or dissenting opinions and phenomena, as did
those from the Special Sector, Stalins secret cabinet, headed by A.N.
Poskrebyshev, the Soviet leaders personal secretary (the latter reports mostly
monitored party members, the police, the government, and the army). On the other
hand, reports from party functionaries, which were collected by the Information
Sector of the Department of Leading Party Organs (Otdel rukovodiashchikh
partiinykh organov, or ORPO), headed in the mid-1930s by Nikolai Ezhov, aimed
at providing a more well-rounded picture of popular dispositions. Unlike the police
or the Special Sector, party leaders were not looking for oppositional opinion  on
the contrary, it was to their benefit to portray society as supportive of the
regime4  but functionaries nevertheless could not help encountering negative
sentiments. Thus the ORPO reports are more reliable in showing oppositional
opinion than in demonstrating support for the regime, through no fault of the party
representatives who compiled them. The latter wrote their reports largely on the
basis of comments made at meetings at factories and farms, but information also
came from conversations overheard in shops, trains, and at social gatherings, as
well as from written communications, such as graffiti on walls and from leaflets. In
addition, reports occasionally drew on denunciations, but compilers of the svodki
usually identified such sources, and were not hesitant about appraising their
reliability (or lack thereof).5
2. A recent example are the interviews with schoolchildren of the 1930s in Larry E. Holmes,
Part of history: The oral record and Moscows model school No. 25, 1931-1937, 
 
Slavic
Review
 
, 56 (Summer 1997): 279-306.
3. I have also used citizens letters to the press and to Soviet leaders, but I will not discuss them
here.
4. Although reporters also had to demonstrate that they had not become blinded to counter-
revolutionary activities and that their revolutionary vigilance had not become blunted. 
5. See, for example, Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskikh dokumentov
Sankt Peterburga (TsGAIPD, the former Leningrad Party Archive), f. 24, op. 5, d. 2290, ll. 20,
60; f. 24, op. 5 (ch. III), d. 2714, l. 121; f. 25, op. 5, d. 44, l. 9. Here one should mention a
peculiarity of the archival system as a whole, and a significant feature of the Soviet regime, as
exemplified by its record-keeping  the 
 
kult
 
 
 
lichnosti
 
 method of archival collection. Which
documents were saved seems to have depended on who was in charge of a particular region.
This problem was brought home to me by my work in both the former Leningrad and Moscow
party archives (TsGAIPD and TsGAOD (Central State Archive on Social Movements),
respectively). These two archives did not hold equivalent materials for my topic. While one can
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It might be worthwhile first to look briefly at how some of the 
 
svodki
 
 Ive
examined (which here will largely be from ORPO) fit into the (western)
historiography of the Stalin era. I do not posit discrete, coherent historiographical
schools, but rather stages, or building blocks, and I would break them into four
instead of the usual two. What is interesting here is how the materials in the 
 
svodki
 
can act almost as Rorschach prints for interpretations of Stalin-era history. One can
find aspects of all four of the stages in the opinions of Leningraders that made it
into the reports. For example, with the first stage, during which what is usually
labeled the totalitarian interpretation prevailed, and which began in the 1950s and
1960s, political ideology and the importance of the personality and power of the
leader were privileged. Advocates of this interpretation saw 1917 as a breaking
point (along with 1902  the idea of the centralized party  and 1921  the
partys banning of factions), and emphasized the distinctiveness of a type of
political system run as a police state, with tight control over the kind of information
to which people had access, and in which dissent was not tolerated.
 
6
 
 Certainly this
latter aspect of the totalitarian interpretation is manifest in the 
 
svodki
 
, which
provide numerous examples of people with unhealthy views on a particular
subject being hauled off to the NKVD for questioning (or worse).
 
7
 
The second stage of the historiography, which could be termed the state and
society or social history stage, focused less on ideology and more on the
dichotomy between the state and social forces. This interpretive school first
appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, although some aspects of it (such as the
emphasis on bureaucratism) go back at least as far as Trotskii. Instead of seeing
1917 as a breaking point, it emphasized 
 
continuities
 
 between pre- and post-
revolutionary Russia, such as in the role of the peasantry and its social structure, or
 
6. Examples of writings at this stage include Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
 
The permanent purge:
Politics in Soviet totalitarianism
 
 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Robert V.
Daniels, 
 
The conscience of the revolution: Communist opposition in Soviet Russia
 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert Conquest, 
 
The Great Terror: Stalins
purge of the thirties
 
 (London: Macmillan, 1968).
7. E.g., TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, l. 132; 
 
ibid
 
., f. 25, op. 5, d. 66, l. 90ob.
find examples of all manner of counterrevolutionary and negative opinion in the Leningrad
collections, materials for corresponding topics and dates in the former Moscow party archive
appear to be non-existant, and in many cases the dela in opisi for what might have been useful
materials were marked unichtozheno. My hypothesis on this is that Nikita Khrushchev, having
not only survived Stalin but then going on to implement de-Stalinization as well, made sure that
potentially harmful records of Moscow under his leadership (1935-1938) did not survive.
Leningrad party chief A.A. Zhdanov, on the other hand, having died suddenly in 1948, did not
have the opportunity (and probably did not foresee the necessity) for housecleaning in the
archives. So much the better for researchers. See also A.N. Ponomarev, Nikita Khrushchev:
nachalo karery (Dokumentalnyi ocherk), in Neizvestnaia Rossiia XX vek (Moscow:
Istoricheskoe nasledie, 1993) 3 : 141-142, for indications that some Khrushchevian documents
were indeed burned. Also William C. Taubman, personal communication (June 18, 1997), who
reported confirmed evidence that Khrushchev had some of his speeches removed from
Ukrainian archives, as well as unconfirmed information from senior Russian scholars that this
was so.
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the roots of Stalinist rule in the reigns of Ivan IV and Peter I.
 
8
 
 On the other hand,
this group tended to see 
 
discontinuities
 
 between Lenin and Stalin, which were
caused, variously, by Stalins personality, the militarizing effects of the Civil War
on society, and the growth of the bureaucracy, against which Lenin had railed at the
end of his life.
 
9
 
 Moreover, at this interpretive stage the rule of Stalin was not
considered to be historically determined; alternative paths, such as that proposed by
Nikolai Bukharin, were resurrected and even celebrated.
 
10
 
 In the 
 
svodki
 
 from
Leningrad, this aspect of the historiography is supported by the numerous examples
of peoples appreciation for the views of earlier oppositionists, especially
Trotskii.
 
11
 
For some historians, however, there still seemed to be too much emphasis on
Stalin and on the power of the center; the rest of the population, both party and non-
party, was either missing or completely passive, and the narrative read rather too
much like When bad revolutions happen to good people. Thus arose the so-called
revisionist school, beginning in the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, which challenged
the view that Stalin was the only source of the political and social violence of the
time; some violent initiatives came from below as well, and were not necessarily
planned or even encouraged by the regime.
 
12
 
 In addition, researchers began to focus
not only on who was hurt by the terror, but also on who prospered from it,
 
13
 
 and
who supported it.
 
14
 
 Representatives of this stage of the historiography used a larger
source base than had their predecessors, and examined (or re-examined) not only
old sources such as memoirs, but also the hitherto little-used Smolensk archive,
as well as materials from the Hoover and Bakhmeteff archives and the large number
of interviews from the Harvard Project. (Numerous excellent studies, many of
which are still frequently cited, had already been produced in the 1950s from the
latter project.)
 
15
 
 In the 
 
svodki
 
, there is ample (if not always obvious) evidence of
 
8. See, e.g., Robert C. Tucker, 
 
Stalin in power: The revolution from above, 1928-1941
 
 (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), esp. ch. 1; Moshe Lewin, Rural society in twentieth-
century Russia, in id., 
 
The making of the Soviet system: Essays in the social history of
interwar Russia
 
 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).
9. E.g., Roger Pethybridge, 
 
The social prelude to Stalinism
 
 (London: Macmillan, 1974); Moshe
Lewin, 
 
Lenins last struggle
 
 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
10. E.g., by Stephen F. Cohen, in 
 
Bukharin and the Bolshevik revolution: A political
biography, 1888-1938
 
 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), and Bukharin, NEP, and
the idea of an alternative to Stalinism, in id., 
 
Rethinking the Soviet experience: Politics and
history since 1917
 
 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
11. E.g. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, ll. 85, 100-100ob, 137.
12. For example, J. Arch Getty, 
 
The origins of the great purges: The Soviet Communist Party
reconsidered, 1933-1938
 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
13. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin and the making of a new elite, 1928-1939, 
 
Slavic Review
 
,
38 (1979): 377-402, and id., 
 
Education and social mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934
 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
14. Robert W. Thurston, 
 
Life and terror in Stalins Russia, 1934-1941
 
 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996).
15. For example, Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, 
 
The Soviet citizen: Daily life in a
totalitarian society
 
 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).
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support for the regime, in addition to abundant examples of the careerism and
opportunism that helped the regime to function more efficiently.
 
16
 
 
Meanwhile, as battles raged between adherents of the first two groups and the
third (as well as within groups, which were not necessarily coherent or well-
defined), the situation in the Soviet Union was changing. The policy of 
 
glasnost
 
was allowing for the publication of long-suppressed works, authorities at the
highest levels began publishing archival material that touched on some of the
white spots of history, and oral history and reliable statistics became more widely
available. Then, with the August 1991 putsch and the break-up of the Soviet Union,
came the opening of the archives to non-party and foreign scholars. These
developments sped up the emergence of a growing resistance school of Stalin-era
historiography, which challenged earlier depictions of Soviet citizens as only
victims or supporters of the regime.
 
17
 
 These archival events coincided nicely with
the growing popularity of post-colonial studies and the works of James Scott.
 
18
 
 My
own work thus far might be classified as being a part of this fourth category, and
certainly the most thrilling part of reading through hundreds of 
 
svodki
 
 was seeing
so many examples of dissent, resistance, heroism, and plain human decency amidst
the opportunism and inhumanity. Ones sense of euphoria in coming across
repeated instances of in-your-face talking back to the authorities, large and small,
could probably only be matched by the regimes own paranoia.
 
19
 
Hence, for the historian, there is a constant tension between wanting to give
voice to those who have been silenced for so long, on the one hand, and on the
other, not painting a picture of more resistance than there actually may have been.
This being duly acknowledged, one should thus emphasize the importance of using
a wide variety of sources, in order to show the scope of responses to the policies of
the Stalin government. The party 
 
svodki
 
 (much less the police or Special Sector
reports) are not the best place to find all of the varieties of opinions, especially ones
indicating support for the regime, mostly because in the 
 
svodki
 
 the positive, pro-
regime statements  which the reports repeatedly state represent the vast
 
16. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5 (ch. III), d. 2714, ll. 71-72, 87-89, 93. 
17. An early example is Lynne Viola, 
 
Peasant rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the
culture of peasant resistance
 
 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
18. E.g., James Scott, 
 
Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance
 
 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and 
 
Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden
transcripts
 
 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
19. With regard to the euphoria, one might keep in mind the words of Arlette Farge: ...[I]s
there a tendency to attribute overmuch meaning to these archives, emerging as they do from
silence; and rather than a reflection of the real, might they not in fact be the oasis for satisfying
our own thirst to see the poor and wretched spring to life? [...] Does the seductive influence of
the archives risk falsifying or distorting the object being studied? A. Farge, 
 
Fragile lives:
Violence, power and solidarity in eighteenth-century Paris
 
, trans. Carol Shelton (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1993): 3. On the other hand, as Gábor Támas Rittersporn notes,
Even if the shortcomings and difficulties [mentioned in Soviet official documents] are
represented as nothing but fleeting epiphenomena [which, of course, is how they indeed were
represented], in reality they happen to be facts of great significance. G. Rittersporn, 
 
Stalinist
simplifications and Soviet complications: Social tensions and political conflicts in the USSR,
1933-1953
 
 (Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991): 20.
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majority of sentiment
 
20
 
  are indistinguishable from the leaden, sloganistic
statements printed in the party newspapers (in this case, 
 
Leningradskaia pravda
 
).
Thus, it is nearly impossible to determine if these statements were genuine; one
cannot distinguish from among them the true believers, the opportunists, and the
fearful.
 
21
 
 The speakers would have had little to lose by publicly parroting the
governments propaganda (although perhaps anti-regime coworkers might not have
appreciated the voicing of such sentiments, and might have wished to settle with the
speakers after the meetings). Even party members were aware that some
expressions of support for the regime might have been disingenuous. In one such
case, a cleaning woman at the Samoilova First State Candy and Chocolate factory
remarked to members of her political literacy circle that those [women] workers
who are weeping over [the assassinated Sergei M.] Kirov just want to get
promoted.
 
22
 
On the other hand, persons making negative statements  which party
functionaries nearly always characterized as being merely 
 
otdelnye
 
 or
 
edinichnye
 
  under Soviet conditions of the 1930s would have had little to gain
and much to lose from doing so, and thus such statements would not appear to be
self-serving.
 
23
 
 This, and the earthy, realistic, informal, and often unprintable
language of the negative statements lend them an air of believability.
 
24
 
 So do their
sense of humor, their demonstration of the range and complexity of peoples
opinions, and their conveying of emotions  love, boredom, frustration  to
which one can easily relate, across the decades, miles, and socioeconomic
barriers.
 
25
 
20. Or, more precisely, the reports would claim that people supported the regimes policies

 
edinodushno
 
.
21. This is especially the case for published reports of pro-regime opinion. See Diane Koenker,
Men against women on the shop floor in early Soviet Russia: Gender and class in the socialist
workplace, 
 
American Historical Review
 
, 100 (December 1995): 1440, where she notes, It is
often difficult to separate the prescriptive reports from the descriptive, difficult to determine
when an account represents the partys voice and when it expresses the authentic voice of the
shop floor. [...] In evaluating reports of conflicts on the shop floor, one must be perpetually
aware that the reports submitted by workers were selected for publication to inculcate values
and prescribe behaviors. D. Koenker adds: Even archival accounts may have been sent up the
line worded so as to meet with political approval.
22. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 46, l. 34. There may also be an ingenuous, involuntary need for
people in general to try to please interviewers and repeat information from news accounts and
headlines. See, for example, the analysis of witnesses to the July 1996 crash of Trans World
Airlines Flight 800 off the coast of Long Island, New York, The least dramatic crash witnesses
carry the most weight, 
 
New York Times
 
 (August 17, 1996).
23. Some of the subjects of the reports, on the other hand, would make contrary claims  that
anti-regime sentiment was far greater than what could be publicly expressed. For example,
according to the calculations of a 
 
kolkhoznik
 
 in Borovichskii 
 
raion
 
, for every ten who cried
[on learning of Kirovs death], one hundred were glad. TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 5, d. 2290, l. 29ob.
24. Ian Kershaw makes a similar point in his assessment of reports of criticial opinion during
the Third Reich. I. Kershaw, 
 
Popular opinion and political dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria,
1933-1945
 
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): 8.
25. The statements of impatience and boredom come across especially strongly. 
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There are some definite advantages to working with 
 
svodki
 
, which permit the
exploration of a number of issues that were simply not feasible even ten years ago.
We cannot, even now, come up with anything resembling an accurate portrayal of
the 
 
distribution
 
 of opinions among the population. However, if one collects as large
a sample as possible,
 
26
 
 focusing on statements that appear to have gained nothing
for the speaker or writer, on realistically-worded opinions, as well as on reports of
arguments, one can find some striking demographic patterns about which groups of
people held certain opinions, and why, and under what circumstances, and which
issues concerned which segments of the population.
A good example of demographic breakdown can be found in the rumors that
occurred in the aftermath of Leningrad leader Kirovs death on December 1, 1934.
One especially persistent rumor concerned the latters purported extra-marital
activities, specifically with Milda Draule, the wife of the assassin, Leonid
Nikolaev, whose jealous rage then supposedly fueled Kirovs murder. These
rumors were long known to western researchers from 
 
samizdat
 
 memoirs and other
émigré sources. Already in 1938 Anton Ciliga was casting doubt on Kirovs marital
fidelity, while Elizabeth Lermolo mentioned (if skeptically) the rumor in her 1955
memoir.
 
27
 
 The story received its most enthusiastic exposition from Lidiia
Shatunovskaia, who stated that everyone in Kremlin society believed that
Kirov was killed because of Draule; the author breathlessly described the alleged
fatal scene in Smolny, with Nikolaev barging in on a Saturday afternoon tryst
between Kirov and Draule, the latter two then trying to escape down the corridor
through a secret door, but ultimately unable to get away from the jealous husband.
 
28
 
Serious analysts, from Roi Medvedev to Dmitrii Volkogonov, have all felt it
necessary to discuss the rumor, if only to hypothesize about when and how it was
planted.
 
29
 
 Mikhail Kheifets wrote that the NKVD released two variants on the story
of the Kirov murder, one  that Kirov was killed by a Zinovevite  for the
general population, and another  that the cuckolded Nikolaev killed Kirov out of
jealousy  for party circles.
 
30
 
 
 
26. How large is large? Because the reports were not gathered under objective, scientific
conditions, it would seem ludicrous to make statements about statistical significance, margins
of error, and the like. A more subjective method would be to consider an oppositional opinion
significant when its repetition becomes monotonous  perhaps after ten times. I simply
collected as many examples as possible  as many as time would permit (and as the archive
director would allow me to photocopy). And I will try to reproduce as many as editors and
publishers will permit. 
27. Anton Ciliga, 
 
The Russian enigma
 
, trans. Fernand G. Renier and Anne Cliff (London:
Labour Book Services, 1940): 171 (the book was originally published in France in 1938 under
the title: 
 
Au pays du grand mensonge
 
 (Paris: Gallimard)); Elizabeth Lermolo, 
 
Face of a victim
 
,
trans. I.D.W. Talmadge (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955): 83, 276.
28. Lidiia Shatunovskaia, 
 
Zhizn v Kremle
 
 (New York: Chalidze Publications, 1982): 174-176,
178.
29. E.g., Roy Medvedev, 
 
Let history judge: The origins and consequences of Stalinism
 
, trans.
Colleen Taylor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971): 158; Dmitrii Volkogonov, 
 
Triumf i
tragediia. Politicheskii portret I.V. Stalina
 
 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Agenstva pechati Novosti,
1989), I, pt. 2: 93-94.
30. Mikhail Kheifets, Taina zloveshchikh priznanii, 
 
Vremia i my
 
, 70 (1983): 187.
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In fact, if one tracks the progression of the rumor from day to day in the 
 
svodki
 
,
one can see that the jealousy rumor appeared soon after Kirovs death, and
disappeared after the middle of the month. At that point, only the vaguest
accusations against class enemies had been made. The stories of Draule, 
 
et al.
 
,
began to disappear just as the accusations against the Zinovev opposition appeared
in the press on December 18. Thus it is possible that the regime did let out these
rumors and, seeing the results, decided to go more quickly in choosing whom to
accuse. More interesting, perhaps, is the demographic profile of who actually
repeated the romantic liaison story, which tends to confirm Kheifetss version. That
is, not only are urban, higher-echelon, largely male speakers (
 
sluzhashchie
 
, party
members, students) a plurality in this group (of those mentioning the Draule story),
but they are an absolute four-to-three majority  completely out of proportion to
their 33% of the total (of Leningraders making negative statements).
 
31
 
 Persons
toiling in industry comprise only approximately a third of this group (in contrast to
their being greater than one half of the overall total), and peasants are a negligible
percentage of those citing personal motives as the reason for Kirovs murder. These
results also happen to conform with earlier observations, based on the Harvard
Project study of this age cohort, that urban intellectuals were much more likely than
workers or peasants to believe rumors over the press.
 
32
 
 Non-intelligentsia types,
and especially women, were generally less interested in what we might consider
celebrity gossip, and preferred to take on weightier political and economic topics.
This kind of information in the 
 
svodki
 
 can help historians to redefine the
demographic categories they use. Peasant versus worker, or rural versus urban, is a
seemingly natural categorization (at least the Soviets thought so). But for the 1930s,
this is especially problematic, of course, because of the millions of peasants
pouring into the cities. While the identification of speakers by their occupation or
workplace location and by their social origin (if known) is useful, I found that these
factors were not necessarily the most relevant in influencing peoples opinions,
despite the continual efforts of party activists to ascribe unhealthy opinions to a
persons less than optimal class background.
 
33
 
 More important was their
socioeconomic level. This may now seem obvious, but ten years ago few writers
were emphasizing how overwhelming a preoccupation food and shelter were for
ordinary people  and not just for those starving in Ukraine or living in caves in
Magnitogorsk  during the 1930s, and therefore, how less relevant could be the
concerns of western scholars. In Leningrad city and 
 
oblast
 
 during the 1930s, the
topics of choice were food and shelter and, with regard to the former, the abolition
of rationing for bread and related products beginning on January 1, 1935. No matter
 
31. Or as one party member at the Lenin plant, repeating a story he had heard from others,
commented regarding Kirovs alleged 
 
iubochnik
 
 proclivities, Had Kirov done less chasing
after women, hed still be alive. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 45, l. 9.
32. Raymond A. Bauer and David B. Gleicher, Word-of-mouth communication in the Soviet
Union, 
 
Public Opinion Quarterly 
 
(Fall 1953): 307 (table 4).
33. See Lesley A. Rimmel, Another kind of fear: The Kirov murder and the end of bread
rationing in Leningrad, 
 
Slavic Review
 
, 56 (Fall 1997): 491.
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how hard party leaders and propagandists tried to keep people focused on more
political topics such as the conspiracies of enemies, ordinary Leningraders  the
mostly non-party people at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale  insisted on
bringing the discussions back to earth and voicing their concerns about food prices.
Where possible, Leningraders did try to connect their own needs to discussions of
enemies, so that e.g. study of the exile of class-alien elements in 1935 could
become an occasion for denouncing possible class enemies in the hope of obtaining
vacated housing. In any case, one learns from reading opinions in 
 
svodki
 
 that
economic problems transcended peasant or industrial worker categorizations,
and that ones outlook and ability to empathize with others also transcended such
categorizations.
 
34
 
Other demographic classifications that I found to be less useful than expected
were 
 
partiinost
 
 and age. Active party membership, during the mid-1930s at least,
did not imply support for the regime; this was even less true of 
 
Komsomol
members, who demonstrated a spectrum of attitudes from ardent belief in party
goals, to confusion and disillusionment, and to cynicism and opportunism (the
tendency for young people to attend Komsomol meetings for the dancing was very
pronounced.)35 Likewise, youth generally are difficult to pidgeonhole; they range
from party enthusiasts to militant opponents. Their family backgrounds offer little
clue to their own opinions; much depended on family dynamics and the
individuals own decision-making. Nevertheless, in my samples, youth were
disproportionately represented among speakers making negative comments, as
were both urban and rural toilers (as opposed to sluzhashchie) and women.36
What exactly constituted a negative comment? That this was not always
clear  to party members as well as to the general public  lends support to the
contention that anti-enemies campaigns, and the propaganda that accompanied
them, were usualy not well planned or orchestrated. It was not easy being a party
propagandist; no matter how well schooled instructors and other party publicists
were, they could not finesse propaganda materials that were contradictory,
incomplete, or simply made no sense. For example, for three weeks after Kirovs
assassination, the regime did not reveal that Nikolaev had been a party member, and
thus saying that he was one was considered to be unhealthy by the propagandists.
34. See ibid.: esp. 486-489.
35. See, for example, TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 5, d. 2290, ll. 17, 29ob, 61; f. 25, op. 5, d. 45, ll. 83,
101, 102; f. 25, op. 5, d. 47, l. 76; f. 25, op. 5, d. 52, l. 219. The issue of dancing was already
controversial among Komsomol members during the NEP years; see Anne E. Gorsuch, NEP
be damned! Young militants in the 1920s and the culture of Civil War, Russian Review, 56
(October 1997): 574. 
36. One has to bear in mind the enormous population changes taking place in the Leningrad
region during this time. Thus a longitudinal study of popular opinion might best be thought of
as snapshots of particular moments in the life of the region. Significant shifts, such as in the
expulsion of what was left of the former aristocracy, the arrest of former opposition members,
the removal of invalids and members of the Lumpenproletariat, and the difficult-to-monitor
movements of peasants into and out of the city and throughout the various raiony, did bring
about shifts in popular opinion as well.
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This did not stop people early on from speculating on it, however: And why do
you think that Nikolaev was a class enemy who by deception wormed his way into
the party? M.A. Alekseeva, a physics teacher in Vasileostrovskii raion, asked a
colleague. Its possible that he was an honest party member who became
disenchanted with its policies. It can happen that we waver, for example under the
influence of the hunger in Ukraine and the Urals.37 Party cell instructors reported
being bombarded with allegations of Nikolaevs partiinost, and struggled valiantly
to refute them. What do you mean, was [the assassin] a party member? was the
indignant rebuff of one party member. Really, such riff-raff could never make
their way into the party.38 Despite the fact that Nikolaev had indeed been a party
member, the police were concerned about the frequency of this rumors
appearance in the reports, while party cell leaders and propagandists were
frustrated by the proliferation of such beliefs and longed for specific directions on
how to handle them. The partorg of the citys Institute of Socialist Agriculture, for
example, reported that party members and candidates had pleaded for information
to counter the growing number of versions circulating among their listeners. Not
knowing the actual situation, the report continued, its difficult to give a
rebuttal. This was echoed by the partorg of the Electro-Technical Institute,
Chapkovets, who asked, What can I say about the murder of Comrade Kirov 
that he was killed by the class enemy?  when the papers are silent on the subject;
and therefore I am unable to refute and rebuff all manner of rumors on the
murder.39 The party leaderships usual response to such requests was (vaguely) to
admonish publicists to improve mass explanatory work.40
Even worse for the propagandists, needless to say, were the more obviously
wrong speculations on the murder concerning Kirovs possible marital infidelity.
As the director and party cell secretary of the Leningrad State Academic Theater of
Opera and Ballet complained to ORPO, In view of the generally understandable
[sic!] insufficiency of newspaper information about Nikolaev, and about the
circumstances connected with the murder, the staff are feeding themselves on all
kinds of rumors.41 Likewise, in the days before any information on Nikolaev was
provided, the secretary of the Krasnogvardeiskii raion cell wrote, with
exasperation, The raikom especially points out the necessity of the decisive
unmasking of counterrevolutionary conversations about how the murder of
Comrade Kirov was motivated on personal grounds.42 Such laments from party
37. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 45, l. 94.
38. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 52, l. 137. See also ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 44, l. 14; f. 25, op. 5, d. 47,
l. 103; f. 25, op. 5, d. 51, l. 40; f. 25, op. 5, d. 52, ll. 158ob, 194, 196. 
39. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 45, l. 110.
40. Apparently this response had been typical since the earliest days of Soviet history. See, e.g.,
L.A. Molchanov, Neobkhodimo usilit propagandu, Istoricheskii arkhiv, 4 (1996): 193.
41. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 46, l. 105 (December 5); again, it tended to be those not employed
in physical labor who expressed the most interest in rumors.
42. Ibid., f. 24, op. 5, d. 2291, l. 56.
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organizers underscore the reliability of the svodki; these are not examples of the
false modesty of ritualistic and difficult-to-interpret samokritika, but rather of
genuine anguish.
Audiences on either side of an issue were quick to catch inconsistencies in
whatever happened to be the governments current narrative. A common reaction to
announcements of newly-discovered enemies throughout the 1930s was disbelief
and indignation  not necessarily because of support for the accused, but because
people wondered why the government had taken so long to uncover them, or had
missed earlier opportunities to punish them. If the Zinovev opposition was active
here, queried a worker at Red Instrument-maker on December 17, 1934, when
Zinovev and his associates were first publicly implicated in Kirovs murder, then
why wasnt he exiled at the same time with Trotskii [in 1929]?43 This would be a
constant refrain for the next several years.44
Moreover, Leningraders were getting two messages about enemies, and
instructors were utterly confused as to how to respond. News articles in
Leningradskaia pravda stressed orderly procedures. For example, on December 23,
the NKVD announced that Zinovev, Kamenev, and other members of the newly-
styled Moscow Center had been arrested and that their cases would be given to
the NKVD Special Board, with a recommendation of administrative exile, as not
enough evidence had been found for a trial at that time. But editorials in the
newspaper, on the other hand, painted a much more sinister picture. Just the day
before, on December 22, readers had seen Zinovevs name linked with Nikolaevs
in the editorial Vile murderers, on the front page along with an announcement
from the NKVD that Nikolaevs case had been transferred to the Military
Collegium of the USSR Supreme Soviet  understood as a one-way ticket to
oblivion.45 Thus, for example, at the Second Five-Year-Plan plant, Fillipov, a
specialist, puzzled, Its hard to make sense of it all. The leading piece in
Leningradskaia pravda for December 22, Vile murderers, leads us to believe that
Zinovev and Kamenev should receive the same punishment as the other
murderers.46 One factory party secretary, Stepanova, wrote that she had had great
difficulty explaining the possibility of exile to her workers, all women, so great was
the clamor for shooting.47 Thus too much agreement with the regimes messages
was just as problematic as outright disagreement.
43. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, l. 67.
44. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 48, l. 33; ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, ll. 46, 66, 67; f. 25, op. 5, d. 50, l. 28.
However, here it would be good to have an actual audio recording of such comments; perhaps
people were speaking sarcastically, although reports often indicated if this was the case.
45. E.g. ibid., f. 24, op. 5, d. 2715, l. 4, where a worker at the Baltic plant remarked, If people
end up at the Military Collegium, it usually means theyll be shot. See also Peter Solomon,
Soviet criminal justice under Stalin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 263,
n. 88, citing Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The time of Stalin: portrait of a tyranny (New York:
Harper & Row, 1981): 150, on the Military Collegiums frightful reputation.
46. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, l. 124.
47. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, l. 119; also f. 25, op. 5, d. 48, ll. 12, 14ob, 20, 35, 37, 41, 43, 46, 51.
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This became especially clear after the verdicts of the in camera trial of the
Moscow Center of Zinovev, et al., were published on January 18, 1935. The
build-up since mid-December had been intense, and by the day of the
announcement, the newspapers were full of such shrill headlines as The workers
of Leningrad demand the strictest punishment for the vile traitors.48 Thus to some
Leningraders, the sentences did not seem to correspond to the crimes. The
investigation could not establish a criminal case against the Moscow Center in the
slaying of Kirov, but could only confirm that members of the Moscow Center
knew about the terrorist inclinations of the Leningrad group and had themselves
[helped] stir up those inclinations.49 Therefore, the proletarian court (the
Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, it turned out) assigned
punishments of ten years imprisonment to Zinovev and three others, with the rest
getting five to eight years. The newspapers announcement  entitled Proletarian
verdict  assured readers that the toilers of our land will greet this verdict with
unanimous approval.
Yet this was hardly the case. There were numerous examples of people (often
older workers) who stood up for Zinovev or other former leaders, as well as those
who, on the contrary, felt that the Moscow Center was being treated too leniently.
In an example of the latter case, a worker, Gorelov from the Marti plant, stated, If
[the Zinovev group] isnt liquidated, then the court will be violating the
governments decrees on traitors.50 Propagandists were placed in an awkward
position when members of their audiences, such as the worker Razguliaev of the
OGPU plant, complained:
Yesterday [i.e., January 17] we held meetings about the publication of the
indictment, in which we demanded merciless reprisal against the class enemy,
and today the press tells us that the proletarian court has given a sufficiently
harsh punishment to the ideological inspirers of the class rags. They should get
what they deserve.51
Speakers who felt that the Moscow Center members were getting off easy often
pointed out the unfairness of the big guys being left alone, while small fry were
executed: They give a cabby ten years for theft, and these scum also get ten years,
a worker from Red Instrument-maker asserted.52 Others, with a touch of local
boosterism, seemed resentful that the Leningrad Center was being punished more
harshly than the Moscow Center. Because workers calls for execution of
enemies were such a staple of the propaganda of the 1930s, the possibility that these
were government-generated responses in disguise cannot be discounted. But the
propagandists themselves always categorized these statements as negative or
48. Leningradskaia pravda (January 17, 1935).
49. Ibid.
50. TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 5, d. 2715, l. 11.
51. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 65, l. 60.
52. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 48, l. 65.
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unhealthy, sending examples of these along with statements supportive of
oppositionists on to the NKVD, and they stressed how much work they put into
trying to explain how well the sentences fit the crimes. Svodki thus can provide
an illuminating portrait of propagandists engaged in the mental (and emotional)
gymnastics necessary to keep up with the regimes ever-changing interpretations of
events.53 
As noted earlier, however, svodki are generally not the best place to find reliable
instances of pro-regime opinions; they are largely non-existent in NKVD and
Special Sector files, and the examples given in the ORPO files are usually too
stereotyped to decipher. But in the latter there are exceptions. For example,
believable as pro-regime comments are praises to the leaders  for the wrong
reasons. It is difficult to tell if workers echoes of the newspapers depiction of the
slain Kirov as the truest son and most beloved leader of the Bolsheviks are
heartfelt. But what do appear to be genuine are the numerous expressions of grief
for Kirov based on national chauvinism and anti-Semitism. For instance, the
worker Zotin at the Stroiprom Association commented, There, you see, what
scoundrels  amid the leaders there was one Russian, Comrade Kirov, and thats
the one they killed.54 Usually connected to the nationality issue were praises of
Kirov at the expense of Stalin, or occasionally of Kaganovich. Too bad about
Kirov, since he was Russian; it would have been better to have killed Stalin, stated
Komsomolka Levina of the Red Instrument-maker plant.55 But not all unhealthy
praise came on the basis of nationality; Kirov did have some real admirers, such as
Gorshkov, a worker in the foundry section of the Pirometr plant, who was
obviously not trying to score any points with the powers-that-be when he mused, It
would have been better to have killed Stalin, but its too bad about Kirov; Kirov
loved the poor.56 Thus through such backhanded compliments can the researcher
find honest attempts to differentiate from among the leadership  although far
more common than these were blanket condemnations. 
Another place to find believable pro-regime comments (and nuanced opinions)
in the svodki are in the reports of interactions and face-to-face encounters that
53. The authorities were well aware of this problem, and of the skepticism of some
Leningraders. The NKVD reported that a history teacher, Laski, at school no. 10 in Kirovskii
raion, criticized the hypocrisy of his fellow teachers, whose interpretations, like that of the
party instructors, changed with the political winds: The history you claim to be teaching is
worthless. At one time everyone was singing Zinovevs praises, and his books were published
in great quantity, and now theyre putting him away for ten years. To tell the truth, if you
compare Zinovevs works with those of certain other leaders, then Zinovev comes out ahead.
TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 2v, d. 1188, l. 165. The NKVD concluded here that there were still too
many alien elements among schoolteachers. 
54. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 44, l. 8; also ibid., l. 6; ibid., d. 47, l. 43. Of course, Kirov was not the
only Russian, but some Leningraders were not especially accurate in their characterizations
of the leaders backgrounds.
55. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 47, l. 162. Also ibid., d. 44, l. 70; d. 45, l. 112; and d. 47, l. 45. 
56. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 47, l. 43. A reader of the report had marked K.R. in especially heavy
pencil alongside this remark. See also ibid., l. 104; d. 45, l. 104; d. 52, l. 127ob (for a
bookkeeper, Ostrovskaia, expressing the soft Kirov thesis).
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illustrate different sides of an issue. Sometimes these reports confound the usual
stereotypes of various kinds of people. For example, in a discussion among
members of a two-month-old kolkhoz in the village of Borisovo, in Ustiuzhenskii
raion, the highest-ranking member was the most anti-Communist  who was also
considered to be the most lazy. The latter, Nikolaev, who was the kolkhoz
president, and a group of kolkhozniki and edinolichniki were talking as they
worked at a mill. Nikolaev, commenting on Kirovs murder, observed, One has
been killed; they should all be slaughtered. Theyve tortured the peasant long
enough. Look how they used force to drive us into the kolkhoz, and now well die
from hunger. But an unidentified woman retorted, Why are you trying to
agitate  youre talking complete nonsense. Look, in our kolkhoz we get
7 kilograms of bread for the labor-day; yet you say youll croak from hunger in the
kolkhoz. Youre an idler, thats what. To which Nikolaev responded, Dont
boast; we only know that theres no way out  theres no alternative to [the
Communists] authority. We have to endure it while we still have endurance left.57
Other reports of face-to-face confrontations confirm what one might expect
about the generation and gender gaps of the Stalin years. One such example came
from a young candidate party member, Fedorova, who reported in great detail to her
deputy party organizer, Bushtyrkov, on her ineffective attempts to explain the truth
about Trotskii and Zinovev to a group of mostly older, skilled workers at the Kirov
plant. They had argued about Trotskiis Lessons of October and about the latters
role in the revolution; one of the workers, Bakhmutev, asserted for example that if
there had been no Trotskii, there would be no Soviet Union. A recent graduate of
the factory-plant school, Rastigaeva, admonished Fedorova, Dont you meddle if
you dont know what youre talking about  listen to your elders. Fedorova ran
into the group a few days later, and the debate over the relative contributions of
Stalin and Trotskii to the October Revolution continued. Mikhail Smirnov, a
marker, termed the recent accusation against Zinovev preposterous, and
compared it with the Nazis having blamed a Communist for starting the Reichstag
fire. And likewise, Smirnov added, in the villages theyre clamping down on
kulaks; for example, in the village where I lived, there was a fire for which they
blamed the kulaks. But kulaks werent guilty; the fire was caused by carelessness.
More arguments ensued; Rastigaeva called the Komsomol a riff-raff
organization, and added unsisterly insult to injury by advising Fedorova to get
married and not waste her time with the Komsomol.58
Thus despite the partys continual efforts to use older workers for propaganda
purposes (to compare the bad old days with the present), there were other older,
skilled workers to counteract the official ones. Moreover, migrants from the
57. Ibid., f. 24, op. 5, d. 2291, l. 32a. Seven kilograms per labor-day was considered to be quite
high. See V.A. Seleznev and A.Ia. Starikova, Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v severo-
zapadnom raione (1927-1937 gg.) (Leningrad: Izdatelstvo LGU, 1970): 17; and Sheila
Fitzpatrick, Stalins peasants: Resistance and survival in the Russian village after
collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 31 (on idlers), 146.
58. TsGAIPD, f. 25, op. 5, d. 49, ll. 100-100ob.
SVODKI AND POPULAR OPINION IN STALINIST LENINGRAD 231
countryside, such as Smirnov, were not always ignorant of world events, and were a
source of information and networking between countryside and city. Meanwhile,
the young, hapless, and not terribly well respected party candidate Fedorova,
unsuccessful in her propaganda effort, channeled her frustration by denouncing the
group as an anti-party circle. The people involved found out about it, and told her,
The time will come and we will settle accounts with you.59 One can easily see
here the kinds of confrontations that would provide fodder for more deadly actions
in the future.
At this point one should mention the important role of old sources, such as
memoirs, in providing believable examples of pro-regime opinion. Old sources
helped to establish the very topic of the terror. Apart from these works, there was
little other information on the victims of state violence under Stalin (and under the
Communists generally), and certainly not from the victims point of view. And
even had complete and reliable figures been published detailing the number of
people arrested, exiled, sent to camps, or shot  along with information on what
became of all their family members  we would not have had a very compelling or
memorable picture of the terror. (When one man dies its a tragedy. When
thousands die its statistics, Stalin reportedly told Winston Churchill.)60 Labor
camp, cold, lice  these words might mean little without the skillful and
penetrating accounts of such writers as Evgeniia Ginzburg, Mariia Ioffe, and
Varlam Shalamov,61 to name just a few, who were able to impress upon the reader,
if only temporarily, the horrors that these people faced. As one gets deeper into
ones research, there is a temptation to become submerged in the minutiae and the
mass of details, and the danger of overintellectualizing the topic becomes real.
Thus, it is helpful  and necessary  to read another memoir from time to time.
And one can glean useful information on attitudes from the best of the memoirs.
The limitations of such memoirs are well known. Authors individual biases
must be taken into account, as well as that of their milieu. Nadezhda Mandelstam,
for instance, may have written of the whole country, when in fact she could at
most claim to speak for a small, if important, group of the USSRs leading artists
and intellectuals.62 Thus memoirs can provide invaluable descriptions of specific
times, places, and events that the authors themselves experienced. But a larger
context is often lacking, and observations relevant to one segment of society may
be irrelevant to others. Former or current Communists rarely ask why or how,
and few query themselves on why and how they earlier managed not to notice the
59. Ibid., f. 25, op. 5, d. 48, l. 11.
60. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, op. cit.: 278 (citing an incomplete reference to Churchills The
Second World War).
61. E.g., Evgeniia Semyonovna Ginzburg, Journey into the whirlwind, trans. Paul Stevenson
and Max Hayward (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967); Mariia Ioffe, Odna noch.
Povest o pravde (New York: Khronika, 1978); Varlam Shalamov, Kolyma tales, trans. John
Glad (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980).
62. Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope against hope: A memoir, trans. Max Hayward (New York:
Atheneum, 1970): 316.
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regimes abuses, when they were inflicted on other people.63 Finally, émigré
accounts may be biased in that refugees often have to psychologically justify to
themselves the often wrenching decision to leave native land and language,
especially when a return is out of the question, and thus one would expect them to
emphasize only the negative aspects (which would not be difficult). Interestingly,
this did not appear to be true of the Harvard Project interviewees, many of whom
seemed to appreciate the educational opportunities they received in the Soviet
Union. Another problem with memoirs, testimonies, and such is that they do not
always address the same issues, and thus there are not enough of them to construct
convincing arguments as to the prevalence of a particular view. Quantity does
matter.
But, again, old sources such as memoirs can be useful in attempting to locate
bases of support for the regime. Because, as noted earlier, the extent of pro-regime
views is sometimes difficult to determine from the Leningrad svodki, memoirs can
fill an important gap. As with the svodki, it is important to consider what the
speaker or author had to gain by expressing a certain opinion. If there was no
benefit to the speaker, then the statement would tend to have greater credibility.
Thus one of the best places to find genuine agreement with Soviet policies of the
1930s might be in the memoirs of those who later became dissidents (for example,
Petro Grigorenko, Lev Kopelev, or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.)64 By the 1950s, such
people would have had nothing to gain by portraying themselves as having been
loyal to Stalin or to Communism. It is possible, of course, that latter-day dissidents
may have had doubts even while in the thick of helping to execute Soviet policy in
the 1930s, and later glossed over or forgot having had these doubts because of guilt
at not having acted on them. But this seems less likely; many memoirs from former
dissidents appear to have been an honest attempt at raskaianie for the naïve
enthusiasms of youth. A good counter-example which illustrates this point is
provided in Michael David-Foxs analysis of Abdurakhman Avtorkhanovs
autobiographies, which turn out to be inconsistent with archival records. As David-
Fox notes, Avtorkhanov would have had plenty to lose in the 1950s, when he was
employed by the United States, in portraying himself as having once been a true
believer.65 This denial of his actual beliefs at the time of the first Five-Year Plan
corresponds with the discrepancy in his account of his whereabouts, and therefore
his understanding of the situation, at that time. Thus one has to be especially careful
with memoir accounts that portray the author as having been engaged in dissent
63. See, e.g., Irina Alekseevna Efimova, Zhena vraga naroda, unpublished manuscript,
Scientific and Information Center of Memorial, St. Petersburg, Russia.
64. Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1982); Lev Kopelev, The education of a true believer, trans. Gary Kern (New York: Harper
& Row, 1980); Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An experiment
in literary investigation, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
65. See Michael David-Fox, Memory, archives, politics: The rise of Stalin in Avtorkhanovs
Technology of power, Slavic Review, 54 (1995): esp. 995-996. 
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when it was dangerous to do so. Memoirs often shed more light on the era when
they were written than on the time they are supposed to be describing.
Nevertheless, there is much agreement between old sources and new ones,
especially party svodki. This is especially true of materials from the Harvard
Project and from the Bakhmeteff Archive. For example, in The story of a
Leningrad worker from the Bakhmeteff Archive, the worker, Peter Stoilov, voices
the same complaints that repeatedly occurred among workers in the TsGAIPD
svodki, such as those concerning all the voluntary donations of labor and money
that workers were pressured to make (especially in the mid-1930s). Another
worker, Anna Ivanovna M., likewise spoke of her dislike of all the political
meetings workers were obliged to attend during the lunch break and after work. The
TsGAIPD files are filled with similar expressions of annoyance.66 Among the
subjects of the Harvard Project, there were numerous examples of those who, like
their counterparts in the Leningrad svodki, felt that many people merely pretended
to believe in the governments propaganda in order to get ahead.67
Svodki cannot tell the whole story of events and opinions in the 1930s. But the
whole story cannot be told without them.68 Using svodki it may not always be
possible to follow the trail of one particular person throughout the decade;69 they
are perhaps more useful for an archeology of knowledge.70 But if svodki do
nothing else, they help to humanize an often inhumane era. Statistics become
people with names, histories, and strong opinions. These people often resist being
categorized  either by the regime that claimed to rule in their name, or by latter-
day scholars claiming to speak for them. Their concerns often had little to do with
the concerns of researchers, but their sorrows, and their laughter, can reach readers
many years later. Ascertaining the veracity of government svodki will always be an
art, not a science, that must be informed by ones knowledge of the era and
supplemented by other kinds of sources. But a close examination of svodki rewards
66. Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia
University, David Dalin file, Story of a Leningrad worker, 6; Anna Ivanovna M., 4;
TsGAIPD, e.g. f. 25, op. 5, d. 44, l. 14; ibid., d. 45, l. 108; ibid., d. 46, ll. 52, 135, 151; ibid.,
d. 50, l. 7. 
67. Harvard Project on the Soviet social system, Schedule A, vol. 3, no. 25: 25, 27.
68. Another example of the usefulness of svodki is in helping to trace the origin of a particular
decree. In one instance, the Leningrad NKVD, reporting to local party chief A.A. Zhdanov on
the need for greater control of the populations movements in and out of the city, proposed
remedies which became the basis of a Leningrad oblast party bureau decree on May 17, 1935.
Here one can clearly see the heavy influence of the police on Communist Party policy at this
time. (The original report is in TsGAIPD, f. 24, op. 2v, d. 1188, ll. 70-71; the decree is in
Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii (RTsKhIDNI), f. 17, op.
21, d. 2722, 11. 63-64. The wording of much of the report and of the decree is identical.)
69. Although occasionally one can find a petition or letter to a leader protesting a denunciation
that one first came upon in a report. 
70. To borrow the title of one of Michel Foucaults less frequently-cited works, The archeology
of knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972).
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the researcher by revealing a multifaceted society, much of it at odds with the
regime and, eventually, increasingly at odds with itself.
Oklahoma State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Department of History
501 Life Sciences West
Stillwater Oklahoma 74078-3054
e-mail: lrimmel@okway.okstate.edu
